Reflections of an Institutional Economist: Charles Whalen, Part IV
This is the last post of a four-part series in which the author reflects on four decades of studying and working in the institutionalist tradition of economics. Dr. Charles Whalen is a visiting scholar at the Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy, University at Buffalo, and served as the 2018 president of the Association for Evolutionary Economics, an international organization for economists and other social scientists seeking to advance the institutionalist tradition. Whalen's remarks are summarized in four parts: Beginnings; The Nature of Institutional Economics; John R. Commons’s Continuing Relevance; and Assessing the Economy.
Reflections of an Institutional
Economist
Charles Whalen[1]
IV. Assessing the Economy: “Reasonable Value” and
Unanswered Questions
By what standard should we judge the
economy and public policy?
Conventional economics judges economic outcomes according to
the standard of economic efficiency. But institutional economists have long
recognized that using efficiency as a yardstick is just a way to dodge the
really important issues. As Al Schmid wrote in an essay on Michigan State
University’s “Spartan” school of institutionalism, “Efficiency is not a single
unique thing, but is derived from collective judgments of whose interests
count.”[2] Al offered even more on this
in an article describing institutional law and economics: “Efficiency for
whom?” is a central question for institutionalists—“since efficiency is always
rooted in some distribution of rights.”[3]
Another dodge is the notion of some abstract “public
interest.“ Institutionalist pioneer John R. Commons rejected the idea of a
public interest “separable from the specific interests of individuals and
classes of individuals that can be used as a beacon to guide public policy.”
Instead, Commons’s offered the yardstick he called “reasonable value.”[4]
Reasonable value is the preferred yardstick for
institutionalists in the Commons tradition. But I believe we need to think much
more seriously about reasonable value and how to achieve it. Most of us have
only waded into the matter over the years; it’s time to dive in.
Commons’s views on reasonable value evolved over time. At one
point, he stressed the role of the courts in determining reasonableness. But
his focus eventually shifted to negotiations between various interests with a
stake in a given problem. From that vantage point, reasonable value is achieved
when representatives of all economic stakeholders reach negotiated settlements
or, ideally, engage in joint problem solving.
Achieving reasonable value is a process. But the process
requires institutions, including, for example, collective bargaining and
regulatory commissions. And the full range of stakeholders and interests must
be represented, ideally by self-selected representatives rather than by people
appointed by government officials. In
fact, Commons argued even the Federal Reserve should be guided by
representatives of a broad set of economic stakeholders, such as workers,
farmers, and small business owners, not just bankers.
Moreover, for the outcomes of the reasonable-value process to
be genuine compromises, there must be willing cooperation among the parties.
That means those at the table must, ideally, have equal bargaining power.
Achieving reasonable value also involves identifying “best practices” and
finding ways to foster their diffusion throughout the economy.
In addition, the outcomes of the reasonable-value process
must constantly be revisited: Reasonable value is always provisional. It needs
updating as situations change, as unintended consequences appear, and as new
“best practices” emerge.
Commons recognized that this system of compromise was
imperfect, but he worried, especially during the Great Depression, that the
alternative was authoritarianism—either in the form of socialism or fascism.
To some extent, my call for us to think seriously about
reasonable value brings me full circle: back to my decision to pursue a
graduate degree in economics under the supervision of Ray Marshall, whose 1987
book, Unheard Voices, highlights the need to give workers a meaningful
voice from the shop floor, to the boardroom, and into the highest reaches of
national and international policymaking. Under Marshall’s guidance, I began
what turned out to be a series of explorations into community-wide
labor-management-citizens committees. While such committees were always fragile
institutions, what we’ve seen over time is that fewer workers have unions to
represent them in such forums — and those unions that do exist often can’t find
businesses, public officials, and other stakeholders willing to join them in
collaborative problem solving.
But my call for us to think about reasonable value is only
incidentally a circling back to themes from decades past. Today, I’m as
concerned about the possibility of undemocratic policymaking as Commons was in
the 1930s. And global warming doesn’t give us the luxury of letting unreasonable
minds shape policy.
Our economic system isn’t a natural system — it’s a social
organization, shaped by invention and innovation and by public policy. Since
the system can’t be left to run automatically, we need more stakeholder
engagement in the making of economic and policy decisions.
The public sector could help: The (community-wide and
plant-level) labor-management committees of decades past were encouraged by
public policy, including federal grants that helped establish such committees.
And public-issues education has long been a part of the work of the country’s
Cooperative Extension system. But if James K. Galbraith is correct, we
shouldn’t expect much from the public sector anytime soon: According to
Galbraith, the dominant feature of contemporary American capitalism is
predation—and agents of a “predator class” now control the U.S. government.[5]
How do we move from where we are to the world of reasonable
value?
Maybe one part of the answer is to move from winner-take-all
elections to proportional representation, which might change the nature of our
legislatures, breaking the grip of what Commons called “banker capitalists.” A
law professor at my university recently delivered a public lecture highlighting
proportional representation. Commons wrote a book advocating proportional
representation in 1896. Perhaps it’s time for us to take a serious look at it.
So, after four decades of studying and using institutional
economics, there’s still lots more to learn. And Commons remains as good a
place as any to start. The aim of his work, to “save capitalism by making it
good,” continues. I look forward to sharing the journey with you.
[1] The author is a
visiting scholar in the Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy, University at
Buffalo. These remarks were originally prepared for a two-day exploration of
institutional economics, convened at Michigan State University, May 16-17,
2019.
[2] A. Allan Schmid, “The
Spartan School of Institutional Economics at Michigan State University,” Staff
Paper 02-03, February 1, 2002, Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan
State University.
[3] A. Allan Schmid, “Institutional
Law and Economics,” European Journal of Law and Economics; vol. 1
(1994), pp. 33-51.
[4] For an excellent,
concise discussion of reasonable value, see Yngve Ramstad, “From Desideratum to
Historical Achievement: John R. Commons’s Reasonable Value and the “Negotiated
Economy” of Denmark,”
Journal of Economic Issues (June 1991), pp. 431-439.
[5] James K.
Galbraith, The Predator State (New York: Free Press, 2008).
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